

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 4553

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y FOR MRN (4553 VICE 4453)

E.O. 11652: GDS12-31-79

TAGS: PFOR, PARM

SUBJECT: CSCE: CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

REF: STATE 190292

WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED LATEST VERSION OF POLADS (73)14 (REVISED), "CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES: ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES." TEXT FOLLOWS BELOW. WE WILL BE GUIDED AT SEPTEMBER 27 SPC MEETING BY REFTEL, AND WILL REPORT RESULTS OF MEETING PROMPTLY.

QUOTE

AS REQUESTED BY THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE ON 31ST AUGUST 1973, THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE HAS RE-EXAMINED POLADS(73)14.
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2. IN SUBMITTING THE REVISED DOCUMENT FOR EARLY CONSIDERATION BY THE SENIOR PLITICAL COMMITTEE AND, EVENTUALLY, THE COUNCIL, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE RECALLED THAT THE CSCE AGENDA ITEM OF MILITARASPECTS OF SECURITY WAS PARTICULARLY

SENSITIVE SUBJECT MATTER, REQUIRING ESPECIALLY CLOSE AND SPEEDY CONSULTATIONS IN BRUSSELS, AS WELL AS MILITARY ADVICE WHENEVER APPROPRIATE, BEFORE PROPOSALS WERE MADE BY ALLIED NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA.

3. THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT IS NOT YET ENTIRELY AGREED. APART FROM THE DIFFERENCE OF OPINION DESCRIBED IN THE SUBSEQUENT PARAGRAPHS, THE FOLLOWING GENERAL OR SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS REMAIN:

(I) THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE HAS RESERVED, FOR THE TIME BEING, HIS POSITION ON THE CONTENT OF THE PAPER.

(II) BEING WITHOUT FINAL INSTRUCTIONS, THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE FORMALLY RESERVED HIS POSITION ON THE PAPER.

(III) SEVERAL DELEGATIONS, THOUGH PREPARED TO RECOMMEND TO THEIR AUTHORITIES ACCEPTANCE OF PARAGRAPH 6 AS NO WORDED, UPHELD THEIR PREFERENCE FOR THE INCLUSION IN THE ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS, IN PRINCIPLE, ON GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL MOVEMENT AND MANOEUVRES, AS WELL AS COMBINED OPERATIONS. ALL DELEGATIONS HAVE RESERVED THEIR FREEDOM TO SPEAK ON ANY PART OF THE DOCUMENT IN THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE AND THE COUNCIL.

4. THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION, BOTH FOR SUBSTANTIVE AND TACTICAL REASONS, BELIEVES THAT A DISTINCTION SHOULD BE DRAWN BETWEEN MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS.

(I) WITH REGARD TO THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS, THIS DELEGATION IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE OVERLAP WHICH COULD DEVELOP BETWEEN A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE ON THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN THE CSCE CONTEXT AND COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS ON MOVEMENTS ENVISAGED AS STABILIZING MEASURES IN MBFR. IT FEARS THAT CONFIDENTIAL

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SHOULD THE CSCE REACH AGREEMENT ON A CBM COVERING MOVEMENTS, WHICH BY DEFINITION WOULD BE PERMISSIVE IN NATURE, THIS COULD CREATE DIFFICULTIES IN TRYING TO PRESUADE THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT A MANDATORY PROVISION REGARDING MOVEMENTS IN MBFR. THIS DELEGATION IS ALSO CONCERNED OVER THE IMPLICATIONS WHICH A CBM ON MOVEMENTS COULD HAVE ON ALLIED MILITARY FLEXIBILITY, AND BELIEVES THAT HIS QUESTION HAS BEEN GIVEN INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION THUS FAR.

(II) WITH RESPECT TO TACTICS, THIS DELEGATION RECALLS THAT AS THE MANDATE ADOPTED IN HELSINKI FOR THE DISCUSSION OF CBMS IN FACT TREATS MOVEMENTS AND

MANOEUVERS SEPARATELY (CALLING FOR PROPOSALS ON THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION ON MANOEUVRES, AND ONLY FOR STUDIES ON THE QUESTION OF NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS), THE ALLIES SHOULD BE PREPARED TO TREAT MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS SEPARATELY IN GENEVA.

5. THE OTHER DELEGATIONS BELIEVE THAT THE ALIED POSITION HELD IN HELSINKI, WITH REGARD TO THE DESIRABILITY OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS, SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN GENEVA. THESE DELEGATIONS, INDIVIDUALLY OR JOINTLY, HOLD THE FOLLOWING VIEWS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE AND TACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE MATTER.

(I) AS A GENERAL CONSIDERATION, IT IS BELIEVED THAT MENTION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN PARAGRAPH 23 OF THE HELSINKI FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS WAS DUE MAINLY TO SUCCESSFUL WESTERN INSISTENCE AGAINST SOVIET RESISTANCE. IT WOULD APPEAR WRONG TO BACK OUT FROM THIS POSITION NOW.

(II) AS REGARDS SUBSTANCE, MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY CONTINUE TO BE CONSIDERED AS AN ESSENTIAL COROLLARY TO THE DISCUSSION OF PLITICAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY, GIVEN THE CLOSE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO. IF CBMS ON MOVEMENTS WERE TO BE STRUCK FROM THE CSCE AGENDA, TOO LITTLE MILITARY SECURITY CONTENT

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WOULD REMAIN. FURTHERMORE, IT IS BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO DRAW A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES. THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN CBMS IN A CSCE CONTEXT AND MBFR CONSTRAINTS COULD BE DRAWN IN CAREFUL EUROPE, BE VOLUNTARY IN CHARACTER, NOT DEFINED IN DETAIL, NOT SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION, AND PROBABLY BE SUPPORTED BY MOST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. IN CONTRAST, THE LATTER WOULD APPLY TO SPECIFIED FORCES OR AREAS, BE OBLIGATORY, NOT RELYING N CONFIDENCE ALONE, AND BE APPLICABLE ONLY TO PARTIES TO RELEVANT MBFR AGREEMENTS,. IT IS FELT UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT MBFR MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS WHILE REFUSING TO CONSIDER CBMS ON MILITARY MOVEMENTS . RATHER, NEGOTIATIONS OF SUCH CBMS MIGHT TEST SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS SERIOUSLY MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY. AS TO ALLIED MILITARY FLEXIBILITY, IT IS FELT THAT IN A SITUATION OF CRISIS , ANY VOLUNTARY CBM WOULD BECOME OBSOLETE ANYWAY AND FULL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHOUT PRIOR NOTIFICATION WOULD BE RESTORED.

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(III) AS REGARDS TACTICS, IT IS FELT THAT THOUGH, IN THE
END, THERE IS LITTLE HOPE OF CSCE AGREEMENT
ON CBMS REGARDING MOVEMENTS, THE NEUTRALS AND
NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES CAN BE EXPECTED TO PRESS
STRONGLY FOR IT, WITH THE SOVIET UNION OPPOSING.
THE ONUS OF REJECTING CBMS ON MILITARY MOVEMENTS
COULD AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE PUT ON THE SOVIETS.
MORE SPECIFICALLY IT WAS SUGGESTED, THAT GIVEN
THE SOVIET OPPOSITION TO THE INCLUSION OF
MOVEMENTS IN AN AGREEMENT ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION
TIT WILL PROBABLY BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE FOR ALLIED
NEGOTIATORS TO START OFF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE
SUB-COMMITTEE BY SEEKING TO OBTAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT
TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT MOVEMENTS SHOJLD BE TREATED
ON THE SAME BASIS AS MANOEUVRES. MOREOVER,
INSISTENCE ON AN EARLY DEFINITION OF THE TWO TERMS,
WHICH WOULD IN ANY CASE BE VERY DIFFICULT, MITH
CAUSE THE RUSSIANS TO BE MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN
THEY WOULD BE LATER ON. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD
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THEREFORE INDICATE THAT THEY DO NOT THINK IT IS
FEASIBLE TO MAKE A MIANINGFUL DISTINCTION BWETWEN
MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS, BUT THAT THEY WILL BE
PREPARED TO EXXAMINE ANY DEFINITIONS THAT OTHER
DELEGATIONS MAY PROPOSE; AND THAT MEANWHILE THE

SUB-COMMITTEE SHOULD EXAMINE THE POSSIBLE MODALITIES OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WOULD INDICATE THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE ON THE BASIS OF THE SIZE OF THE TROOP ACTIVITY INVOLVED AND WOULD REFER TO THE CONSIDERATIONS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 8 AND 9 OF POLADS(73)14(REVISED) TABLING AS ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE SORT OF ACTIVITIES THAT SHOULD BE NOTIFIED SOME LISTS OF PAST MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS. BY THUS CONCENTRATING ON THE SIZE AND SCALE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WOULD LEAVE IT TO THE RUSSIANS TO SEEK TO EXCLUDE FROM CONSIDERATION CERTAIN TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITY ON THE GROUNDS THAT THESE WERE MOVEMENTS RATHER THAN MANOEUVRES. THESE TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS RECEIVED WIDE SUPPORT. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES: ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES TO BE PROVIDED BY THE ALLIED COUNTRIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE

REPORT BY THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. AS REQUESTED BY THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE, THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE EXAMINED THE SUBJECT OF ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES, IN THE LIGHT OF THE COUNCILS DECISION (REFERENCE C-M(72)82) REGARDING THE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES TO BE NEGOTIATED AT THE CSCE. REFERENCE IS MADE IN PARTICULAR (A) TO SECTION II.A.1(C) OF ANNEX I TO C-M(72)82 WHICH SUGGESTS THAT, TO ILLUSTRATE THE

KIND OF INFORMATION IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO FURNISH TO THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE CSCE, NATO MEMBERS MIGHT TABLE RECENT ANNUAL LISTS OF THEIR OWN FORCE MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES AND INVITE OTHERS TO DO LIKEWISE; AND (B) TO THE MANDATE ON "CERTAIN CONFIDENTIAL

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MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY" TABLED AT HELSINKI. NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES CO-OPERATED IN THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE.

2. THE COMMITTEE FELT THAT THE OBJECTIVES PURSUED BY NATO ALLIES IN PROPOSING THEIR LISTS COULD BE BETTER ACHIEVED IF THESE LISTS WERE BASED ON CERTAIN GENERAL CONSIDERATION AND THEIR CONTENT REFLECTED COMMON CHARACTERISTICS.

II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

3. IN DRAWING UP THEIR NATIONAL LISTS AND IN MAKING SELECTIONS FROM THE PAST MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES IN WHICH THEIR FORCES HAVE TAKEN PART, THE ALLIED COUNTRIES MIGHT BEAR IN MIND THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

THAT ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES SHOULD HELP TO DISSIPATE CERTAIN AMBIGUITIES WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE;

THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE FROM THE WP COUNTRIES COMPARABLE ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS CONTAINING THE SAME KIND OF INFORMATION AS THEIR OWN LISTS;

THAT SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES MAY ARISE FROM UNNOTIFIED OR MISUNDERSTOOD MOVEMENTS OF FORCES;

THAT THE SUGGESTED LISTS SHOULD BE KEPT STRICTLY IN A CSCE CONTEXT AVOIDING POSSIBLE CONFUSION WITH COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS IN MBFR (1);

(1) SEVERAL DELEGATIONS POINTED OUT THAT THERE EXIST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN MANY RESPECTS BETWEEN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN A CSCE FRAMEWORK AND MOVEMENT CONSTRAINTS IN MBFR; FOR INSTANCE IN THEIR VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY CHARACTER RESPECTIVELY; IN THE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, IN THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES; AND IN THE NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES. FURTHERMORE, IT WAS STRESSED THAT THE MOVEMENTS OF THE TROOPS WHICH WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM CENTRAL EUROPE AS A RESULT OF MBFR AND BE REDEPLOYED IN THE USSR WOULD BE SUBJECT TO MEASURES MUCH STRICTER THAN THEIR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION.

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THAT ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE FACT THAT "MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES" SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS CONVEYING GENERAL DESCRIPTIVE CONCEPT, NOT AS AN ATTEMPT TO DRAW ABSOLUTE DISTINCTIONS;

THAT, WHILE THERE SHOULD BE NO FORMAL REQUIREMENT TO INVITE OBSERVERS TO EVERY MANOEUVRE LISTED, THE ALLIES WHO WISHED TO DO SO COULD INDICATE THOSE MANOEUVRES TO WHICH THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO INVITE OBSERVERS.

III. FEATURES OF THE LISTS OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES

DEFINITION

4. THE WORDS "MANOEUVRES" AND "EXERCISES" ARE NOT INTER-CHANGEABLE SINCE ALL MANOEUVRES ARE EXERCISES BUT NOT ALL

EXERCISES ARE MANOEUVRES. NOR SHOULD THE WORDS "MANOEUVRES" AND "EXERCISES" BE USED AS AUTOMATICALLY INCLUDING "MOVEMENTS": IN GENERAL TERMS THE DISTINCTIONS ARE THAT MOVEMENTS HAVE MANY

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ASPECTS-MOVEMENT OF TROOPS, EQUIPMENT, INTO, OUT OF, OR
WITHIN AREAS AREAS, TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT, LAND, SEA OR AIR ETC.;
MANOEUVRES ARE NORMALLY TWO-SIDED ACTIVITIES OF REAL FORCES,
TRAINED AND EQUIPPED; EXERCISES INCLUDE MANOEUVRES BUT COULD
ALSO REFER TO EXERCISES OF UNTRAINED OR PAPER FORCES. IN GENERAL,
A MOVEMENT NEED NOT BE A MANOEUVRE, BUT ANY MANOEUVRES IMPLY
MOVEMENT OF FORCES.

5. IN INITIATING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT ON THE
SUBJECT OF PAST MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES WHICH HAVE BEEN
OR COULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED, ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WOULD WISH TO
AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF A BLOC-TO-BLOC APPROACH. IT APPEARS
THEREFORE NECESSARY THAT THE LISTS TO BE SUBMITTED AT THE
COMMITTEE STAGE OF THE CSCE BE ELABORATED AND TABLED ON A STRICTLY
NATIONAL BASIS. THIS SHOULD NOT HOWEVER PREVENT ALLIED COUNTRIES
FROM INCLUDING MULTINATIONAL MANOEUVRES, BUT THEY SHOULD FOCUS
ON THEIR PARTICIPATION AS INDIVIDUAL STATES RATHER THAN AS
MEMBERS OF AN ALLIANCE.

6. THESE LISTS SHOULD INCLUDE MAJOR MOVEMENTS AND
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MANOEUVRES, WHETHER NATIONAL, BILATERAL OR MULINATIONAL IN
WHICH ALLIED FORCES HAVE PARTICIPATED IN EUROPE DURING ONE OR MORE
RECENT CALENDAR YEARS. IT WOULD APPEAR NECESSARY TO INCLUDE IN
THESE LISTS ONLY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES IN WHICH THE UNITS
MENTIONED ACTUALLY PARTICIPATED ACTIVELY THUS EXCLUDING COMMAND

POST TYPE EXERCISES. THE LISTS ARE MAINLY DESIGNED FOR NEGOTIATING PURPOSES AND ARE ILLUSTRATIVE IN NATURE AND MIGHT CONTAIN THE SORT OF DETAIL REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 9 BELOW. IN PRINCIPLE THEY SHOULD INCLUDE ALL GROUND FORCES MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES AS DEFINED IN PARAGRAPH 8 BELOW. MOREOVER, AS LARGE-SCALE MANOEUVRES FREQUENTLY INVOLVE ALL CATEGORIES OF FORCES, AIR AND NAVAL COMPONENTS CANNOT BE IGNORED IN THIS CONTEXT. AIR AND NAVAL MOVEMENTS SHOULD THEREFORE BE INCLUDED IN SO FAR AS THEY FORM PART OF JOINT OPERATIONS. MOREOVER, THE USSR IS ABLE TO STAGE LARGE-SCALE NAVAL AND AIR MANOEUVRES WHICH BY THEMSELVES CONSTITUTE DIRECT THREATS TO THE NATO AREA, AND SUCH MANOEUVRES CANNOT IN THIS CONTEXT BE NEGLECTED. IN ADDITION, IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT OVERRIDING CONSIDERATIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY MAY IN CERTAIN CASES PRECLUDE THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES.

7. THE COMMITTEE ALSO DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY THAT NATO COUNTRIES THEMSELVES PRESENT AN UP-TO-DATE LIST OF RECENT WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES' MILITARY MANOEUVRES SHOULD THE LATTER BALK AT THE IDEA OF SUBMITTING THEIR OWN LIST TO THE CSCE.

SEVERAL DELEGATIONS WERE OPPOSED TO THIS IDEA EITHER BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED IT WOULD INVOLVE AN UNACCEPTABLE INDICATION OF ALLIED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY OR BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT IT INCONSISTENT WITH THE SPECIFIC GOALS OF THESE MEASURES I.E. TO BUILD CONFIDENCE. OTHER DELEGATIONS HOWEVER DID NOT SHARE THESE OBJECTIONS.

IV. INFORMATION ON MILITARY MOVEMENTS OR MANOEUVRES

8. AMONG THE FOREMOST ITEMS OF INFORMATION WHICH THE LISTS SHOULD PRODUCE WOULD BE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE FORCES BROUGHT INTO PLAY IN EACH CASE. ALLIED COUNTRIES AGREED THAT ONLY MAJOR FORCE MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES WOULD REQUIRE PRIOR NOTIFICATION. THERE IS NO SINGLE DEFINITION OF "MAJOR" WHEN APPLIED TO MOVEMENT OF FORCES OR MANOEUVRES SINCE THIS DEPENDS

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ON A NUMBER OF CONCOMITANT FACTORS SUCH AS THE TYPE OF MOVEMENT, ITS LOCATION, ITS MAGNITUDE INCLUDING THE TYPE OF MATERIAL MOVED, ITS DIRECTION, THE EXISTING POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE AREA, ETC. HOWEVER, FOR INTERNAL GUIDANCE IN THE PREPARATION OF NATIONAL LISTS, ALLIED COUNTRIES COULD USE AS A YARDSTICK FOR GROUND FORCES' INVOLVEMENT THOSE MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES WHOSE COMBINED STRENGTH EQUALS OR EXCEEDS THE LEVEL OF A DIVISION. A UNIT OF MORE THAN BRIGADE STRENGTH WITH AIR AND/OR NAVAL SUPPORT COULD, HOWEVER, OPPOSITE NORTHERN NORWAY, CONSTITUTE A DESTABILIZING FACTOR AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE NOTIFIED.

9. AS TO OTHER POSSIBLE INFORMATION THAT THE ALLIES COULD PROVIDE IN LISTING MILITARY MOVEMENTS, THESE WOULD INCLUDE THE NAME OF THE MANOEUVRE OR MOVEMENT, ROUGHLY THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL

INVOLVED, THE PURPOSE OF THE MOVEMENT, THE TIME-FRAME, THE AREA, THE DEPARTURE AND DESTINATION OF THE PARTICIPATING UNITS, THE UNIT DESIGNATION, THE PERIOD OF ABSENCE OF PARTICIPATING UNITS FROM THEIR NORMAL DUTY STATION. A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF INFORMATION WHICH THE LISTS MAY CONTAIN IS TO BE FOUND IN THE PRESS RELEASES OF NATIONAL OR NATO MANOEUVRES SUCH AS EXERCISE STRONG EXPRESS.

V. DEGREE OF ADVANCE NOTIFICATION

10. PRIOR NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE GIVEN NOT MORE THAN 60 DAYS IN ADVANCE.

VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AGREEMENT

11. AS TO THE PRACTICAL WAY OF IMPLEMENTING AN AGREEMENT ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT SUCH NOTIFICATION COULD BEST TAKE PLACE BILATERALLY THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

VII. ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES

12. ANNEX I CONTAINED THE DESIGNATIONS OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES PROPOSED BY DELEGATIONS FOR INCLUSION IN NATIONAL ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS. ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES PROVIDED BY DELEGATIONS ARE ATTACHED AS ANNEXES II TO V.

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(IN THE INTERESTS OF SPEED, THE TEXT OF THESE ANNEXES WILL BE CIRCULATED SEPARATELY AS AN ADDENDUM).

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